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PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
Joseph W. Dellapenna* 
[I]t is an established fact that documents justifying and authorizing the abusive treat-
ment of detainees during interrogation were approved and distributed…. [T]his policy 
demonstrates that this war has tested more than our nation’s ability to defend itself. It 
has tested our response to our fears and the measure of our courage. It has tested our 
commitment to our most fundamental values and our constitutional values.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Immediately after the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, President George 
W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency to undertake electronic surveillance in viola-
tion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.2 This was only the first step of an expansive set 
of claims for the President to act on his own authority to respond to the “war on terror,” without 
regard to whether Congress or the courts would approve or support these decisions. The Presi-
dent claimed, among other powers, the power to launch preemptive wars on his own authority3 
(although in actuality he sought and obtained authorization to use military force from the Con-
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 Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; B.B.A., University of Michigan (1965); J.D., Detroit College of Law 
(1968); LL.M. in Public International & Comparative Law, George Washington University (1969); LL.M. (Environmental Law), 
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1
 Alberto J. Mora, An Affront to American Values, WASH. POST, May 27, 2006, at A25. Mr. Mora retired as Navy General 
Counsel in 2005. 
2
 American Civil Liberties Un. v. National Security Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 to 
1811 (electronic surveillance), 1821 to 1829 (physical searches), 1841 to 1846 (pen registers and similar devices), 1861, 1862 
(access to business records), 1871 (annual reports to Congress) (2000). For the President’s authorization of surveillance, see 
James Risen &. Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. See also James 
Bamford, Private Lives: The Agency That Could Be Big Brother, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, § 4, at 1; Dan Eggan, Bush Author-
ized Domestic Spying: Post-9/11 Order Bypassed Special Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; Eric Lichtblau & James 
Risen, Domestic Surveillance: Spy Agency Mined a Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A1. 
3
 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. See also George W. Bush, Commencement Speech at the U.S. Military Academy, 38 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 944, 946 (June 10, 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/200206010-3. For a recent reaffirmation of this policy, see Peter Baker, 
Bush to Restate Terror Strategy: 2002 Doctrine of Preemptive War to Be Reaffirmed, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2006, at A1; David 
E. Sanger, Report Backs Iraq Strike and Cites Iran Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at A6. See also Robert J. Delahunty & John 
C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Na-
tions that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2002); Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-
Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 685 (2005).  
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 2 
gress4); the power to disregard the laws of war pertaining to occupied lands;5 and the power to 
define the status and treatment of persons detained as “enemy combatants” in the war on terror.6  
These claims were not an accident. Vice-President Cheney stated publicly, more than once, 
that these steps were part of a plan to restore the Presidency to “the proper scope” of its powers 
even more than means to defend the nation.7 Michael Ramsey has delineated the extent to which 
the lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department Justice claimed unilateral authority 
on behalf of the President when the claims were unnecessary for the specific policies for which 
they were invoked8—a pattern suggestive of a goal of aggrandizing Presidential authority beyond 
defense of the nation. This pattern disregards the fact that the President’s duty is to enforce the 
law, not to break it.9 
Questions of Presidential authority are important. The framers of the Constitution expected 
the separation of powers to be the primary protection for liberty.10 They therefore set about to 
structure each branch’s power in ways that allow each to block the other. The framers expected 
                                                 
4
 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, 107th Congress, Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (“Authorization I”); 
Authorization of the Use of Military Force against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002) (“Authorization II”).  
5
 See U.S.-U.K. Letter to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003) (indicating that the two nations “will 
strictly abide by their obligations under international law including those relating to the essential humanitarian needs of the peo-
ple of Iraq”). See David Glazier, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 58 
RUTGERS L. REV. 121, 189-90 (2005); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 COR-
NELL L. REV. 97, 154-63 (2004). 
6
 George W. Bush, Military Order No. 1: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terror-
ism, 66 FED. REG. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). See also Jay S. Bybee (Assistant Att’y Gen.), Memorandum to Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) (“Bybee Memorandum”), available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf; Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and to Wil-
liam J. Haynes, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://wasingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf; Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
on the Status of Taliban and al-Qaeda, Jan. 19, 2002, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/dod/t2204index.html; John 
Yoo (Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen.) & Robert J. Delahunty (Special Counsel), Memorandum to William J. Haynes, II,  General Coun-
sel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://msnbc/msn.com/id.5032094/sitenewsweek. 
7
 Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash Is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen Executive Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, 
at A1; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Cheney’s Power No Longer Goes Unquestioned, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, § 1, at 1; 
Richard W. Stevenson & Adam Liptak, Cheney Defends Eavesdropping without Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, at A36; 
Jim VandeHei, Cheney Says NSA Spying Should Be an Election Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2006, at A7.  
8
 See Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1225-36 (2005). 
9
 Jinks & Sloss, supra note 5, at 123-24. 
10
 James Madison, No. 51, in THE FEDERALIST 267 (1788, reprinted in the Gideon ed. 1818) (George W. Carey & James 
McLellan eds. 2001) (“THE FEDERALIST PAPERS”). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122-23 (1976). 
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the three branches to contend with each other, and in contending to prevent any single branch 
from dominating.11 The framers were prescient—the three branches have contended with each 
other in shifting balances throughout our history. Yet the recent Presidential claims of unilateral 
authority in effect would smother the other two branches.12 Space does not allow a full analysis 
of the powers of the several branches. This article considers wh13ether the claims of unilateral 
Presidential authority can be sustained in light of constitutional text and tradition.  
I. THE POWERS GRANTED THE PRESIDENT 
The grant of powers to the President in Article II of Constitution is short but impressive. 
First, Article II vests “the executive Power” in the President.14 Article II then provides that the 
President: serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces;15 supervises the executive branch, 
with the obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed;16 has the power to grant pardons 
for offenses against the United States;17 has the power to make treaties;18 appoints ambassadors, 
judges, and officers of the United States;19 has the power, on occasion, to control the meeting 
times of Congress;20 and is to receive ambassadors.21 These powers, if granted fully and exclu-
sively to the President would vest in him nearly complete control over the government.  
                                                 
11
 Alexander Hamilton, No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 10, at 401; James Madison, No. 47, in THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS, supra, at 249. See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
12
 Sanger & Schmitt, supra note 7 (quoting Senator Lindsey Graham, R-SC). 
13
 Editorial, Bush’s “Signing” Bonus: He Issues Himself an Out on Torture, NEWSDAY (Nassau Cty., NY), Jan. 8, 2006, at 
A32; David Sarasohn, Presidential Powers: Congress Writes a Law, Then President Rereads It, THE OREGONIAN (Portland, OR), 
Jan. 4, 2006, at B8; Tortured Language: President Bush Signs a Statement that Indicates Prisoner Abuse Might Well Continue, 
ALB. TIMES UN., Jan. 16, 2006, at A6. On signing statements generally, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESI-
DENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS, RECOMMENDATION (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf. 
14
 U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. II, § 1. 
15
 Id., art. II, § 2 (1). 
16
 Id., art. II, §§ 2(1), 3. 
17
 Id., art. II, § 2. 
18
 Id., art. II, § 2(2). 
19
 Id., art. II, § 2(2), (3). 
20
 Id., art. III. 
21
 Id. 
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Yet none of the specific powers, except perhaps the power to pardon and the limited power 
over the meetings of the Congress, are vested exclusively in the President. Congress has the 
power to provide for the common defense,22 to declare war,23 and to provide for and regulate the 
military.24 Congress even was given the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal25—which 
arguably gives Congress responsibility for undeclared as well as declared wars.26 Moreover, Con-
gress has the power to make, and the courts to construe, the laws the President is faithfully to 
execute.27 Three Presidential powers establish his authority over the conduct of foreign relations, 
but two of those (the power to appoint ambassadors and to make treaties) require the advice and 
consent of the Senate (and for treaties, consent must be by a two-thirds majority).28 Thus the de-
scription of the President as the “sole organ” in the conduct of foreign affairs is something of an 
exaggeration.29 Presidential authority to make other appointments also requires the advice and 
consent of the Senate.30 As for the powers to pardon and to control emergency meetings of Con-
gress, while not expressly limited in the text of the Constitution, there is the “necessary and 
proper clause”: “The Congress shall have Power … To make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or officer thereof.”31 
                                                 
22
 Id., art. I, § 8(1). 
23
 Id., art. I, § 8(11). 
24
 Id., art. I, § 8(11)-(16). 
25
 Id., art. I, § 8(11). 
26
 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2072-78 (2005). 
27
 U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 7; art. III, § 2(1). 
28
 Id., art. II, § 2(2). 
29
 United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AU-
THORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2002); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976); Louis Fisher, A Constitutional Structure for Foreign Affairs, 19 GA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 1059 (2003). 
30
 U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. II, § 2(2). 
31
 Id., art. I, § 8(18). See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Some refer to the “necessary and 
proper” clause as the “Sweeping Clause” because it sweeps a broad and undefined power into the hands of Congress. See Randy 
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003); Gary Lawson & 
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Today we are confronted by arguments about a “unitary executive” that, in its more extreme 
manifestations, claims that the powers vested in the President by the Constitution are exclusive 
and plenary—without limitation by the other branches of the government, at least during wars or 
similar crises.32 Such arguments fly in the face the text of the Constitution.33 Some supporters of 
the strong executive power argue that the specific grants of powers to the President are illustra-
tive of an unrestrained grant of “executive Power,” rather than as an exhaustive listing of what 
the “executive Power” comprises.34 This argument is not credible. Why would the Framers have 
bothered to list specific powers, including “some trifling ones,”35 if the “vesting clause” swept 
everything conceivable within its purview? Nor does this theory find support in the history of the 
various clauses.36 The Federalist Papers, for example, viewed the commander-in-chief power as 
simply the power to command troops in the field37 and to repel sudden attacks38—not “as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE 
L.J. 267 (1993). 
32
 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580-83 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND 
PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 
83 U. DENV. L. REV. 335 (2005); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 1591 (2005). A narrower view of the theory of a “unitary executive” simply asserts that all executive officers and agencies 
are answerable to the President for the discharge of their duties, without regard to the power of the President apart from his con-
trol the executive branch. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary 
Executive, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-
So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 953 (2001). 
33
 Reid Skibell, Separation-of-Powers and the Commander in Chief: Congress’s Authority to Override Presidential Decisions, 
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 201-02 (2004).  
34
 Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Siakrishna B. Prakash The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 
(1994) (arguing that the “vesting clause” vests a broad executive power beyond the specific grants delineated in Article II); with 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that the “ex-
ecutive Power” must be read as referring to the specific powers granted in Article II). 
35
 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
36
 Skibell, supra note 33, at 197-205, 208-18; Jeremy Telman, A Truism That Isn’t True? The Tenth Amendment and Executive 
Power, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 135, 153-78 (2001). 
37
 Alexander Hamilton, No. 69, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 10, at 355.  
38
 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand ed. 1937). See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Note, The Dog 
of War as a Puppy: The Constitutional Power to Initiate Hostilities as Answered by the Framing, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 
368 (2003); Telman, supra note 36, at 149-53. 
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power to do whatever it takes to win the war.”39 And consider the federalism concerns if the “in-
herent power” of the President derives from sources outside the Constitution.40  
II. THE POWERS TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT 
Supporters of the “unitary executive” base their claims both on their perception of the neces-
sities of the modern situation and on an extravagant reading of the history of the Presidential 
powers.41 I do not argue whether an enlarged executive power is necessary as a matter of policy. 
My concern is narrower and more technical: Is the President authorized to implement the far-
reaching powers he has decided upon on his own authority, or must he seek Congressional au-
thorization, at least except as a temporary reaction to an emergency? Much of this debate turns 
upon an examination of the historical practice of the office of the President as undertaken by suc-
cessive Presidents and as Congress and the courts have responded those practices. While persis-
tent institutional impropriety cannot make an unconstitutional practice constitutional,42 institu-
tional practices can inform us what authoritative interpreters of the Constitution regarded as its 
meaning, particularly closer to the drafting of the language in question.43  
Over time there has been an accretion of power in the White House, albeit with conflicts and 
setbacks along the way. Struggle over the powers of the three branches began with the Constitu-
tional Convention in 1787 and has continued ever since. The problem arises because the framers 
                                                 
39
 Oral Argument of Paul D. Clement on Behalf of Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 2004 WL 1066129, at *22 (U.S. Apr. 22, 
2004) (comment by Scalia, J.). 
40
 Would this mean that the Tenth Amendment—with its admonition that powers not delegated to the federal gov-
ernment in the Constitution are reserved to the states or to the people—is a dead letter? Telman, supra note 36, at 140-
46. Does the Tenth Amendment, in order to protect the prerogatives of the States and the people, necessarily protect the pre-
rogatives of the Congress and the courts vis-à-vis the executive branch? Id. at 146-79. 
41
 See YOO, supra note 32; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of the 
War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002). 
42
 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
43
 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, un-
broken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presi-
dents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our gov-
ernment, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
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did not clearly indicate where Presidential authority stopped and the authority of the other 
branches began. Given their theory that the protection of liberty arose from the clash of the three 
branches, 44 the framers apparently created this confusion on purpose. The first serious contro-
versy over the President’s authority to conduct foreign relations arose with President Washing-
ton’s Proclamation of Neutrality45 calling upon Americans to refrain from taking sides in the 
conflicts arising from the French Revolution. The proclamation led to an unsuccessful prosecu-
tion of an American merchant seaman for cooperating with a French privateer46 and sparked a 
debate between Alexander Hamilton (writing as “Pacificus”) and James Madison (writing as 
“Helvidius”) over Presidential authority.47 Hamilton argued that the Constitution vested in the 
President an inherent executive authority that included every aspect of traditional executive 
(royal) authority not expressly granted to Congress.48 Yet if the “vesting clause” granting the ex-
ecutive power to the President were so broad, the further listing of specific powers conferred on 
the President was superfluous. The argument also ignores the “necessary and proper” clause.49 
The debate was too indecisive to resolve the scope of the President’s power.50  
                                                 
44
 Madison, supra note 10. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122-23 (1976). 
45
 Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 430-31 (John C. Fitz-
patrick ed., 1939).  
46
 J. KENDALL FEW, TRIAL BY JURY 289-97 (1993) (recounting the course of the trial and the jury’s refusal to convict despite a 
charge from the court that virtually directed a verdict of guilty). 
47
 The “Pacificus/Helividius” essays are reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 63-78 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner 
eds. 1987). 
48
 For modern arguments in favor of this reading of Article II, see YOO, supra note 32; John Yoo, Review Essay: Politics as 
Law? The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 896-901 
(2001). For a careful refutation of Hamilton’s claims, see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism 
and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004). 
49
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18, quoted in the text supra at note 31. For an argument against such a broad reading of the neces-
sary and proper clause, see Saikrishna Prakash, Regulation of Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 225-57 (2005). See 
generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the 
Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). 
50
 Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 48, at 679-87. 
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For truly broad assertions of Presidential powers independently of, or even in defiance of, 
Congress or the courts, we must turn to the Civil War.51 President Lincoln undertook to exercise 
the broadest range of “prerogative power” ever claimed by a President.52 Faced with attacks on 
federal facilities in the South and with the newly elected Congress not yet convened, he under-
took dramatic action to suppress the rebellion,53 calling the militias of the loyal states into federal 
service and for 75,000 volunteers, suspending habeas corpus (first in Maryland and gradually 
throughout the country), proclaiming a blockade of the Southern ports, directing the Treasury 
Department to expend $2,000,000 through New York financiers in support of the war effort, and 
ordering civilians to be tried by military commissions for crimes in support of the Confederacy. 
None of these actions were authorized by statute, yet it was in Congress, not the President, that 
the Constitution vested authority to take such decisions.54 If Lincoln had waited for Congress to 
convene to vote the necessary measures, however, the war might have been lost before it began.55 
When Congress finally convened, Lincoln reported his actions to Congress and asked it to ap-
prove his actions.56 While he argued for the legality of his actions, he also requested Congress to 
                                                 
51
 David Currie has concluded that at least before 1840, every President acted consistently with the terms of the 
War Powers Resolution of 1973: “The President may introduce troops into hostilities only pursuant to a congres-
sional declaration of war or other legislative authorization, or in response to an attack on the United States.” David P. 
Currie, Rumors of War: Presidential and Congressional War Powers, 1809-1829, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000). See also Tel-
man, supra note 36, at 159-65. Washington himself declined to commit troops against Indian tribes without Congres-
sional authorization. SOFAER, supra note 29, at 120-27. 
52
 MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 36 (2003). Rozell defines 
“prerogative power” as an executive power “to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law 
and sometimes even against it.”  
53
 See generally DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 13-17, 115-95 (2003); HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, 
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 214-15, 238-41 (1982); MARK E. NEELY, THE FATE 
OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 3-18, 32, 51-53 (1991); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH 
IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERROR 79-134 (2004). 
54
 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8(11) (“Congress shall have Power … To declare War”); § 8(15) (“Congress shall have Power … To 
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union.”); § 9(2) (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.”); § 9(7) (“No Money shall be 
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by law.”). 
55
 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 15-25 (1998). 
56
 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861) (“Lincoln’s Special Message”), in 4 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1953). See FARBER, supra note 53, at 132-43. 
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 9 
ratify the decisions, with at least an implicit admission that the decisions could not stand after 
Congress was in session unless Congress did approve them—as Congress eventually did.57 
The suspension of habeas corpus was the trickiest problem because Chief Justice Roger 
Taney issued two writs directing the release of persons imprisoned in Fort McHenry in Baltimore 
on suspicion of sabotaging telegraph lines and bridges.58 The state courts in Maryland were open 
and operating but President Lincoln was unwilling to trust Maryland juries and declined to com-
ply with Taney’s order.59 Lincoln’s message to Congress came close to conceding the illegality of 
his defiance.60 Lincoln argued that he had to choose between his general obligation to see that the 
laws are faithfully enforced and the specific obligation to respect habeas corpus. He also argued 
that because of the emergency, his claim of authority to act pending the meeting of Congress was 
a small implication from the constitutional design.61 Lincoln’s argued,  
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were … failing of 
execution, in nearly one-third of the states. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execu-
tion, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their exe-
cution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen’s liberty, that, 
practically, it relieves more of the guilty than the innocent, should, to a very limited ex-
tent, be violated? To state the question more directly: are all the laws, but one, to go un-
executed, and the government to go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a 
case, would not the official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown 
when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?62 
The problem with arguments based on necessity is that claims of necessity can mask a host 
of sins, and what might seem necessary in the heat of the moment can be embarrassing or worse 
                                                 
57
 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). See FARBER, supra note 53, at 138-43. 
58
 Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). See also FARBER, supra note 53, at 188-92; HYMAN & 
WIECEK, supra note 53, at 239-41; NEELY,  supra note 53, at 8-10; Norman Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in the Time of War: 
Politics and Professionalism during the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2061-67 (2005). 
59
 HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 53, at 241; REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 33-35. 
60
 Lincoln’s Special Message, supra note 56. 
61
 Id. See FARBER, supra note 53, at 160-63. 
62
 Lincoln’s Special Message, supra note 56. 
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in hindsight.63 The rule of law is supposed to prevent such embarrassments. Perhaps this is why 
Lincoln followed the argument from necessity with a claim that he was not violating the law—
leaving the Attorney General to fill in the details.64 And it is why the Supreme Court, in calmer 
times, reminded us that: “Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase 
granted power, or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted…”65 
After Lincoln’s defiance of Chief Justice Taney, the courts backed away from confronting 
the President.66 Lincoln’s most famous action solely on the basis of his authority as commander-
in-chief was the Emancipation Proclamation, an executive order issued on September 22, 1862,67 
which was ratified by an amendment to the Constitution.68 After the war, the Supreme Court de-
cided that suspension of habeas corpus when civilian courts are open and operating is unconsti-
tutional,69 only to see Congress promptly revoke the Court’s authority to hear appeals in habeas 
corpus cases.70 But the precedent stands. 
Legal conclusions about the inherent powers of the President from Lincoln’s actions are less 
than clear. Congress, for the most part in fairly short order, ratified his actions. In the two in-
stances in which the judiciary challenged the legality of the President’s actions, Congress sup-
ported the President against the Supreme Court. Congressional ratification of the President’s ac-
tions was enough to end the matter. 
                                                 
63
 Consider the later congressional apology for the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. The Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989 to 1989d (2000). See also Peter Green, 
The King Is Dead (book rev.), NEW REP., Dec. 20, 1997, at 36, 39. (“What stirs our blood may end up embarrassing our 
conscience.”)  
64
 Lincoln’s Special Message, supra note 56. See 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 87 (1861). 
65
 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 425 (1934). 
66
 See, e.g., Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863). REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 135-37; Spaulding, supra note 58, at 
2004-11; Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 S. CT. REV. 47. 
67
 Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). 
68
 U.S. CONST., amend. 13. 
69
 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124-25 (1866). 
70
 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
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Woodrow Wilson was the next President to assert broad powers, particularly after the United 
States entered World War I. He relied on a compliant Congress to authorize the extraordinary 
actions he considered necessary to the war effort.71 He declined to issue an executive order au-
thorizing military courts to try civilians interfering in the war effort.72 Yet he took some actions 
entirely on his own authority. Rather dramatically, he issued an executive order seizing all rail-
roads in the country, ordering them to be operated by a federal administrator,73 also set up the 
Food Administration, the Grain Corporation, and the World Trade Board by executive order.74 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt made extensive use of executive orders in fighting the Depres-
sion, some of which were highly controversial.75 And during World War II, he issued numerous 
executive orders. The most notorious was Executive Order no. 9066,76 authorizing the “exclu-
sion” persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast states—meaning their confinement in 
concentration camps.77 Congress shortly thereafter ratified Executive Order no. 9066 by enacting 
a law making it a felony to violate the order.78 Because of this statute, the Supreme Court upheld 
Executive Order no. 9066 repeatedly.79 Forty-six years later, Congress enacted a formal apology 
                                                 
71
 See, e.g., The Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1918) (making it a crime to “willfully utter, print, write, or pub-
lish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” about the United States and excluding from the mails any material 
advocating “treason, insurrection or resistance to any law of the U.S.”); The Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) 
(punishing criticism of the war or the government, including any form of language intended to cause contempt or scorn for our 
form of government, the Constitution, or the flag). See generally NEELY, supra note 53, at 181; REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 
178-83; STONE, supra note 53, at 135-234. 
72
 SANFORD J. UNGER, FBI 41-42 (1976). Wilson deferred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 2, 124-25 (1866), holding that military courts could not try civilians when civilian courts are open and functioning. 
73
 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919) (upholding the seizure of the railroads). 
74
 See John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders (Part One), 31 UWLA L. REV. 99, 103 (2000). 
75
 See generally Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern Day America, 28 J. 
LEGISLATION 1 (2002). 
76
 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 9, 1942). 
77
 See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 186-91; STONE, supra note 53, at 255-310; ERIC K. YAMAMOTO et al., RACE, 
RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001). 
78
 Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942). 
79
 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). All three convictions would be vacated some 40 years later because of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. 
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The Supreme Court also held, on the same day that it decided Korematsu, 
that detainees who could establish that they were loyal must be released. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
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to the Japanese and Japanese-Americans who had been interned and provided a modest payment 
($20,000 per person) as reparations for the wrong done to them.80  
President Roosevelt also ordered military commissions to try persons arrested in the United 
States “for offenses against the laws of war and the Articles of War.”81 Eight Nazi saboteurs (in-
cluding one American citizen) were arrested and brought before a military commission.82 The 
Supreme Court reviewed the lower court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus,83 but concluded 
that Congress had authorized trial by military commission for violations of the (international) 
laws of war and the Articles of War.84 The Court insisted that it had no authority to review 
whether the defendants were guilty or innocent, but only whether their constitutional rights had 
been violated;85 thereafter six of the eight defendants were executed, including the one American 
citizen. Yet only four years later, in reviewing a writ of habeas corpus for Japanese General To-
moyuki Yamashita who was tried before a U.S. military commission in the Philippines, the Court 
did in fact examine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.86 
During the Korean War, President Truman ordered the seizure of the steel mills in 1951 to 
prevent a strike that would have impeded the manufacturing of military equipment and muni-
tions.87 The majority in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer88 held that the executive order 
                                                 
80
 The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989 to 1989d (2000). 
81
 Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942). See also Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942) 
(appointment of a military commission).  
82
 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The would-be saboteurs were already in custody when the executive orders were issed, 
having been arrested by the FBI. See LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW 12 
(2003). For an argument that these men, or at least the American among them, should have been tried in civilian courts as trai-
tors, see Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 863, 894-900 (2006). 
83
 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1942). 
84
 Id. at 25-30. 
85
 Id. at 25. 
86
 In re Yamshita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
87
 Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952). 
88
 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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was not a military act and therefore not within the President’s authority as commander-in-chief;89 
nor could the order be justified under the duty of the President to see that laws are faithfully exe-
cuted, for he was not enforcing an act of Congress or a command of the Constitution but was 
making his own law.90 The case is better known, however, for Justice Robert Jackson’s concur-
ring opinion—an opinion that has since been endorsed by a majority of the Court.91 Jackson de-
scribed an interpretive continuum according to which a President’s actions must be judged. Jack-
son’s analysis provides a template for analyzing the actions of the current President: 
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judi-
cial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even sin-
gle Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to se-
cure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a 
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, 
autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending 
upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress….  
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own 
right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may 
he be said … to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional un-
der these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided 
whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress 
would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial 
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might at-
tack it. 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of au-
thority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twi-
light in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribu-
tion is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may some-
times, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presi-
dential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories 
of law. 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. 
Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only be disabling the 
                                                 
89
 Id. at 587. 
90
 Id. at 587-89. 
91
 Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 668, 668-69 (1981). 
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Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclu-
sive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilib-
rium established by our constitutional system.92 
Presidential exercises of unilateral authority did not end with Youngstown Sheet and Tube, 
but Presidents thereafter tended to involve Congress in their more controversial actions. In Viet-
nam, the Presidents did claim sweeping authority independently of Congress, although they came 
to be accused of abusing the powers conferred by Congress93 and of lying to Congress to obtain 
authorization for the war.94 Unity between the political branches did not hold. Congress repealed 
the authorization in 197195 and took steps to bar continuation of the War.96 Congress also en-
acted legislation to limit the exercise of presidential authority as commander-in-chief (the War 
Powers Resolution of 197397) and to assure judicial and congressional oversight of intelligence 
gathering within and without the United States (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 98). 
Presidents have never been happy with these restraints, consistently insisting that they are not 
bound by them,99 yet Presidents have complied with them.100 President Bush’s report to Congress 
on the actions taken to respond to the 9/11 attacks exhibits the typical Presidential posture: com-
pliance with the War Powers Resolution’s procedures while insisting that he is not bound by it: 
In response to these attacks on our territory, our citizens, and our way of life, I, ordered 
the deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of 
foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations.... I have taken 
                                                 
92
 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-40, 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
93
 See generally STONE, supra note 53, at 427-526. 
94
 Joint Resolution of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (“The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution”). See JOHN 
HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 19-20 (1993). 
95
 Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2055 (1971). 
96
 See THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 13-33 (1979). 
97
 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541 to 1548 (2000). 
98
 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 to 1871 (2000). 
99
 See STEPHEN DYCUS et al., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 302-26 (3rd ed. 2002); ELY, supra note 94; LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL 
WAR POWER 123-28 (2nd ed. 2004). 
100
 See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: AFTER THIRTY YEARS (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for 
Congress Order Code RL 32267, Mar. 11, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32267.html. 
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these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations 
and as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive.101 
III. PRESIDENT BUSH REACTS TO 9/11 
The scale and success of the attacks on September 11, as well as the evidence that it was a 
part of an ongoing, organized global campaign, perhaps made it inevitable that the Bush admini-
stration would treat the situation as a war rather than as individual criminal conduct.102 President 
Bush the younger declared a “War on Terror”103 and then proceeded in the name of that war to 
take a number of unprecedented steps to secure the nation. Congress endorsed the War by ap-
proving resolutions authorizing the use of force against terrorists and in Iraq,104 by enacting the 
USA  PATRIOT Act,105 and by creating the Department of Homeland Security.106 Yet, even with 
these broad powers in hand, the President claimed powers that no prior President had ever 
claimed: to launch preemptive wars; to establish rules contrary to the recognized laws of war; 
and to conduct surveillance in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.107  
                                                 
101
 President's Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of Forces in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1157, 1157 (Sept. 24, 2001).  
102
 See Bay, supra note 32, at 353-71; Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law 
of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 715-25 (2004) Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 
28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2003).  
103
 George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States in Response to the Terrorist Attacks 
of September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), in 37 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRES. DOCS. 1347, 1348, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html. 
104
 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Authorization of the Use 
of Military Force against Iraq, Pub. L. no. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). For analyses of these authorizations, see 
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26; Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Rejoinder: The War on Terrorism: International 
Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and Constitutional Design, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2683 (2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek 
Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization: International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV.  2653 (2005). 
105
 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, HOW PA-
TRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT? (2004); Thomas V. Burch, “Doublethink”ing Privacy under the Multi-state Antiterrorism Informa-
tion Exchange, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 147 (2004); Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 
29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 175 (2003); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767 (2002); Steven 
A. Osher, Privacy, Computers and the Patriot Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn’t Dead, But No One Will Insure It, 54 FLA. L. 
REV. 521 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of Coinelpro and 
the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051 (2002). 
106
 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. no. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), codified at various sections of 6 U.S.C. 
107
 See the authorities collected supra at notes 2-6. 
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The President made these claims on the basis of his alleged authority under the Constitution, 
powers that allegedly were beyond the power of Congress to regulate, restrict, or control. Many 
of the decisions were taken in secret.108 This may have been because the Bush administration en-
gaged in systematic violations of the laws of war,109 laws defined in a series of conventions 
signed and ratified by the United States.110 Traditionally, the United States had taken the lead in 
creating and enforcing these laws,111 in our national courts112 as well as through international or-
                                                 
108
 The Bush administration seemed to be obsessed with secrecy even when not related to the war on terror. See, 
e.g., Cheney v. District Ct., 542 U.S. 367 (2004). See also Dan Eggan, White House Trains Efforts on Media Leaks: Sources, 
Reporters Could Be Prosecuted, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2006, at A1; Walter Pincus, Press Can Be Prosecuted for Having Secret 
Files, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2006, at A3; Andrew C. Revkin, Call for Openness at NASA Adds to Reports of Pressure, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at A20; Scott Shane, Universities Say New Rules Could Hurt U.S. Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 
2005, at A11; Ellen Smith, Mining for Truth about Sago, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2006, at A23. See also TORIE CLARKE, LIPSTICK 
ON A PIG: WINNING IN THE NO-SPIN ERA BY SOMEONE WHO KNOWS THE GAME (2006). The administration’s obsession with 
secrecy reached its apogee with the efforts of several national security agencies to withdraw and reclassify docu-
ments in the National Archives—documents that in many cases had already been published, and therefore will re-
main public despite the reclassification project. See Christopher Lee, Archives Pledges to End Secret Agreements, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at A4; Christopher Lee, Archives Kept a Secrecy Secret: Agencies Remove Declassified Papers from Public 
Access, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2006, at A6; Scott Shane, National Archives Pact Let C.I.A. Withdraw Public Documents, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2006, at A16; Scott Shane, National Archives Says Records Were Wrongly Classified, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2006, at A24. 
109
 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 325 (2003); 
Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 55 (2003); William H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 
319 (2003). For less critical views of the Bush administration’s actions, see Brooks, supra note 102; Derek Jinks, The Changing 
Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime after September 11?, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2004); Kenneth Roth, The 
Law of War in the War on Terror, 83 FOR. AFF., no. 1, at 2 (Jan.-Feb. 2004). See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2nd ed. 2004); INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR (2nd ed. 2002); LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPO-
RARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2nd ed. 2000). 
110
 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened 
for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3114, 75 UNTS 31 (“First Geneva Convention”); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3217, 75 UNTS 
85 (“Second Geneva Convention”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 UST 3316, 75 UNTS 135 (“Third Geneva Convention”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
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superseded by the Geneva Conventions or other treaties. There are also two protocols to the Geneva Conventions adopted in 
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Conflict, opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Additional Protocol II Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflict, opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. Arguably, the Additional Protocols are cus-
tomary international law. See Advisory Op. on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 2004 ICJ no. 131, ¶¶ 89, 124; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 610, 617 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶¶ 119, 127 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
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 The U.S. Army issued the first codification of the laws of war to achieve wide international influence. GENERAL ORDER NO. 
100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD art. 16 (Apr. 24, 1863). The order was 
drafted by Francis Lieber, and therefore is referred to as the “Lieber Code.” See David Glazier, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: The Law 
of Belligerent Occupation and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 121, 128-48, 151-70 (2005). 
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ganizations113 and tribunals.114 While the United States is no longer a leader regarding these 
rules,115 it did not withdraw its ratifications of the basic documents, nor has it altered its statutes 
pertaining to, the laws of war. On paper, at least, we are still fully committed to the laws of war.  
Gradually the violations of the laws of war became public—particularly the abuse of prison-
ers. Only gradually did it become clear that these practices extended to the systematic cruel, in-
humane, and degrading treatment of prisoners, culminating in some instances in outright tor-
ture.116 Major General Geoffrey Miller was brought from Guantánamo to Iraq to instruct the 
prison guards in the “best” ways to interrogate prisoners.117 And eventually, President Bush ac-
knowledged that these practices—which he termed an “alternative set of procedures” for interro-
gation, were and would, if he had his way, remain government policy.118 Yet the Third Geneva 
Convention expressly prohibits torture,119 while all four Geneva Conventions, in common article 
3, require that “persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of the armed 
forces who have laid down their arms” to be treated “humanely,” which is further defined as ex-
cluding “murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” as well as “outrages upon 
                                                                                                                                                             
112
 See, e.g., Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Calley v. Hoffman, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). 
See also The War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000). 
113
 JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 142-54 (2004). 
114
 Id. at 312-16. 
115
 Id. at 154-63, 317-18. 
116
 See UN COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON ARBITRARY DETENTION, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 
INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF TORTURE AND DETENTION (59th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 11(a)), UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8 (2002). 
See also Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 319-23, 329-35 (2004); Dana Priest & Baron 
Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1; David Johnston, At a Secret Inter-
rogation, Dispute Flared over Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at A1; Shannon Smiley & Craig Whitlock, Turk Was Abused 
at Guantanamo, Lawyers Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2006, at A11; Craig S. Smith & Souad Mekhennet, Algerian Tells of Dark 
Term in U.S. Hands, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at A1. 
117
 See Josh White, Top Officer Ordered to Testify on Abuse: Use of Dogs to Scare Detainees at Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 
2006, at A14 (“White, Top Officer”). See also John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 16; Nathan 
A. Canestaro, “Small Wars” and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the Insurgents in Iraq, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73 
(2004); Josh White, Memo Shows Officer’s Shift on Use of Dogs: Abu Ghreib Commander Urged End to Tactic But No Punish-
ment for Guards, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2006, at A11 (describing the testimony of Colonel Thomas Pappas) (“White, Shift on 
Use of Dogs”). 
118
 R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush Says Detainees Will Be Tried: He Confirms the Existence of CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 
2006, at A1. For the full text of the Presidents remarks, see President Bush Delivers Remarks on Terrorism, available at 
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 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 110, arts. 13, 17, 130. 
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personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”120 Common article 3 applies 
to conflicts “not of an international character.” The Supreme Court resolved doubts about the 
meaning of this phrase in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,121 holding that the phrase encompasses all con-
flicts other than conflicts between nations.  
The United States has also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“Civil Rights Covenant”), which prohibits torture122 and the Convention against Torture.123 And 
the Third Geneva Convention, the Civil Rights Covenant, and the Convention on Torture forbid 
derogation from the prohibition of torture—unlike other provisions of the Geneva Conventions, 
there is no military necessity exception to the ban on torture.124 The United States, in ratifying the 
Civil Rights Covenant, included a reservation that “The United States considers itself bound by 
article 7 to the extent that ‘cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment’ means the 
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States.”125 The UN Committee on Human Rights concluded that 
the reservation was incompatible with the terms of the Civil Rights Covenant and therefore is 
void, although the ratification is valid.126 Even if that is not correct, can anyone contend that in-
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 Id. art. 3. See also First Geneva Convention, supra note 110, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 110, art. 3; 
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 110, art. 3.  
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tense and on-going mistreatment, even if it does not cause death or severe physical or mental in-
jury, is not “cruel and unusual punishment” as prohibited by the United States Constitution?127 
The Bybee Memorandum sought to evade these strictures by taking the position that if inter-
rogation does not involve life-threatening techniques or serious permanent physical injury 
(“equivalent to organ failure,” or mental suffering that lasts “months or years”), then there is no 
torture.128 This was translated by U.S. soldiers guarding prisoners into the slogan, “No blood, no 
foul.”129 The practices that resulted from such an attitude range from relatively mild all the way 
up to death: deprivation of sleep, food, and water; covering detainee’s heads with hoods; forcing 
of them to stand in physically stressful positions; the use of dogs to intimidate and abuse prison-
ers; “waterboarding”; and the beating or suffocating of prisoners to death.130  
Apparently realizing that the argument about the meaning of torture was weak, the authors of 
the Bybee memorandum also claimed that the President has the power to authorize torture not-
withstanding applicable conventions and federal statutes: “Congress may no more regulate the 
President’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to 
direct troop movements on the battlefield.”131 This argument would make the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice unconstitutional, despite the Constitution’s vesting in Congress of authority to 
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“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”132 Why the au-
thors of the Bybee Memorandum chose to do all of this on the authority of the President without 
involving Congress and the courts, and over the objections of the lawyers in the military services 
and other operational branches of the government,133 is clear—these other institutions could not 
be relied upon to approve the torture or near torture that the administration wanted to use.  
The highly dubious constitutional argument that the President, as chief executive and com-
mander-in-chief, cannot be restrained in his decisions about the conduct of military operations 
has been deployed in defense of indefensible conduct. As Jeremy Waldron put it, “This is not just 
tinkering with the details of positive law: It amounts to a comprehensive assault on our tradi-
tional understanding of the whole legal regime relating to torture.”134 And no legal legerdemain 
can explain how the President can order such torture when Congress has expressly prohibited 
torture and the nation has ratified treaties forbidding it.135 Even if, somehow, one believes these 
practices are not torture,136 Congress has now enacted the Detainee Treatment Act to ban cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment.137 Since January 1, 2006, there really is no room for argument 
that the international standards do not apply in full. Yet President Bush responded with a “sign-
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ing statement” in signing the bill in which he insisted that nothing in this law impaired his pow-
ers as commander-in-chief to do whatever is necessary to protect the country.138 
IV. THE DENOUEMENT, PERHAPS 
The other branches of government long deferred to the Presidential assertions of authority, 
contrary to the expectations of the framers of the Constitution.139 But, just as lawyers played key 
roles in preparing documents purporting to justify the various policies instituted on the sole au-
thority of the President,140 lawyers challenged the various policies instituted from the begin-
ning—often acting as pro bono (unpaid) volunteers in defense of the rule of law. Eventually, 
several of their cases reached the Supreme Court of the United States.141 While the Court consis-
tently ruled against the government in these cases, the Court ruled on narrow grounds that did not 
address the questions of whether the President was exceeding his constitutional powers until the 
Court decided the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld142 in 2006. 
Hamdan involved the prosecution of a former chauffeur for Osama bin Laden for various 
war crimes. The prosecution was to be before a military commission created by executive order 
consistent neither with normal civilian (“Article III”) courts nor with normal military courts 
(“Courts Martial”).143 The Court divided 5-3 (with the Chief Justice, who had voted in favor the 
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government in the case at the Court of Appeals level,144  recusing himself) held that the President 
lacks authority to create such a tribunal in the face of valid statutes limiting the types of courts 
and procedures to be used in such trials.145 The Court, in an opinion by Justice John Paul Ste-
vens, held that mere emergency (“exigency alone”) does not justify the creation of “penal tribu-
nals” that are not authorized by Act of Congress or the Constitution itself146 and went on to reaf-
firm the most central holding of Ex parte Milligan:147 the President’s job is to enforce the law, 
not to make whatever laws he likes in disregard of binding Acts of Congress or valid treaties.148 
The Court then carefully examined the procedures provided for the proposed military commis-
sions and found that those procedures violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the 
four Geneva Conventions.149 Justice Anthony Kennedy declined to join some other parts of the 
majority opinion, but concurred in all of the points just discussed.150 Justices Samuel Alito, An-
tonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas dissented on a range of points in opinions written by Scalia 
and Thomas. Justice Scalia focused primarily on whether the Court had the authority to review 
Hamdan’s appeal at all,151 while Justice Thomas wrote an impassioned defense of the President’s 
power to command the military without let or hindrance from the court.152 
Justice Stevens’ opinion was long, technical, and narrow, perhaps in order to avoid the risks 
of appearing to be too “activist” in a case where the future safety or even survival of the nation 
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might be at risk.153 Still Justice Stevens’ opinion made the point that the President could not pro-
ceed without Congressional authorization.154 The opinion also confined itself to the question of 
the use of the Presidentially created military commissions to try persons accused of crimes, and 
did not mention, even in passing, the numerous other Presidential assertions of unilateral author-
ity to defend the nation. While the implications of the decision for these other assertions of au-
thority seemed clear enough, the Bush administration insists that it applies only to the military 
commission question.155 
Has the President learned anything from his errors? It seems not. As of this writing, the 
President and a newly aroused Senate are locked in disagreement over whether to enact a statute 
authorizing the procedures disapproved in Hamdan156—secret trials, denying a defendant access 
to some of the evidence, with hearsay entered into evidence, and without confrontation of the 
witnesses.157 The President is even more adamant about modifying other unilateral policies that 
at the least intrude upon the responsibilities of Congress, some of which are arguably illegal.158 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
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Disclosure of these practices had disastrous effects for the global image of the United States. 
From the near unanimous support for the United States after the September 11th attacks.159 In 
barely three years, the Bush Administration managed to make the United States an international 
pariah.160 And the image of the United States—one of our more important assets during the Cold 
War—has only gotten worse since.161 And we pay a predictable price, as when the Chinese offi-
cials dismiss criticism of their violations of human rights with the response that “they have no 
lessons to learn from an administration that produced the abuses at Abu Ghreib prison in Iraq and 
detainment centers in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.”162  
The domestic consequences these asserted powers are no less momentous. The various ac-
tions constitution a pattern—a plan even163—of asserting Presidential authority to act unilater-
ally, regardless of the authority or decisions of the other branches of government. The Pentagon, 
moreover, has announced plans for a “long war”—one that would last decades.164 And the nature 
of the war made by terrorists makes it difficult to sort combatants from civilians, to identify “en-
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emy aliens,” to determine whether someone is captured on a battlefield or elsewhere, or even to 
determine whether the enemy has been defeated and the war is at an end.165 All this makes argu-
ments about the need to set aside the usual rules for the duration of the emergency alarming.166  
This pattern of arrogation of power should alarm any unbiased observer. As Bill Keller, Ex-
ecutive Editor of the New York Times, stated recently, “I don’t know how far action will follow 
rhetoric, but some days it sounds like the administration is declaring war at home on the values it 
professes to be promoting abroad.”167 Justice David Souter, in his concurring opinion in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, expressed what ought to be the national attitude: 
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of 
guaranteed liberty whether in peace or in war (or some condition in between) is not well 
entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to 
maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Govern-
ment asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s en-
tire reliance on striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the 
way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that secu-
rity legitimately raises.168  
Justice Souter’s analysis might be considered prudential, yet his analysis points to something 
more basic, as Justice Robert Jackson pointed out more than 50 years ago in Youngstown Sheet 
and Tube:169 the President’s power to act unilaterally is strictly limited by the Constitution and by 
valid treaties and acts of Congress. Constraints on the unilateral authority of the President are 
among the most central safeguards of our liberties. Have the terrorists succeeded in making it 
impossible for us to uphold those limitations? Or are we just afraid to take reasonable risks in 
order to uphold our ideals? 
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